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Abstract—For a discrete or a continuous source model, we
study the problem of secret-key generation with one round of
rate-limited public communication between two legitimate users.
Although we do not provide new bounds on the wiretap secret-
key (WSK) capacity for the discrete source model, we use an
alternative achievability scheme that may be useful for practical
applications. As a side result, we conveniently extend known
bounds to the case of a continuous source model. Specifically, we
consider a sequential key-generation strategy, that implements a
rate-limited reconciliation step to handle reliability, followed by
a privacy amplification step performed with extractors to handle
secrecy. We prove that such a sequential strategy achieves the
best known bounds for the rate-limited WSK capacity (under the
assumption of degraded sources in the case of two-way communi-
cation). However, we show that, unlike the case of rate-unlimited
public communication, achieving the reconciliation capacity in a
sequential strategy does not necessarily lead to achieving the best
known bounds for the WSK capacity. Consequently, reliability
and secrecy can be treated successively but not independently,
thereby exhibiting a limitation of sequential strategies for rate-
limited public communication. Nevertheless, we provide scenarios
for which reliability and secrecy can be treated successively and
independently, such as the two-way rate-limited SK capacity,
the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity for degraded binary
symmetric sources, and the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity
for Gaussian degraded sources.
Index Terms—Secret-key capacity, secret-key generation, rate-
limited communication, reconciliation, privacy amplification
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretic secret-key generation protocols [2],
[3] draw their strength from a security relying on information-
theoretic metrics rather than on complexity theory, thereby
avoiding the assumption of limited computational power for
the eavesdropper. In such protocols, two legitimate users
(Alice and Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve) observe the
realizations of correlated random variables (RVs), discrete or
continuous. The legitimate users, who can exchange messages
over a public channel, aim at extracting a common secret key
from their observations. The rules by which the legitimate
users compute the messages they exchange over the public
channel and agree on a key define a key-generation strategy.
The maximum number of secret-key bits per observed real-
ization of the RVs is called the wiretap secret-key (WSK)
capacity [2], [3].
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Closed-form expressions and bounds for the WSK capacity
have been established for a large variety of models [2]–[10].
However, usual achievability proofs rely on a random binning
argument and thus, do not always provide direct insight into
the design of practical key-generation strategies. Moreover,
such proofs handle reliability (the legitimate users must share
the same key) and secrecy (the key must be unknown to the
eavesdropper) jointly, which might limit the flexibility of the
scheme.
A more constructive scheme is a sequential key-generation
strategy, which consists of two steps that handle reliability
and secrecy successively instead of jointly. A reconciliation
step [11] is first performed, during which Alice and Bob com-
municate over the public channel to agree on a common bit
sequence, which might not be totally hidden from Eve. Then,
a privacy amplification step [12], [13] is performed, during
which Alice and Bob apply a deterministic function to their
shared sequence to generate their common secret key, this time
completely unknown from Eve. The main benefit of sequential
key-generation strategies is to separate how one deals with
reliability and secrecy,1 and thus to provide a perhaps more
practical key-generation design. Indeed, reconciliation can
be efficiently implemented with LDPC codes [14], [15] and
privacy amplification can be performed with extractors [12],
[13]. While sequential key-generation is studied in [13], [16]
for a public channel of unlimited capacity, we focus on the
performance of sequential key-generation strategies in the case
of rate-limited public communication.2 Note that sequential
strategies have also been used for secrecy purposes in [17],
in which a practical capacity-achieving scheme involving
invertible extractors is proposed for the symmetric wiretap
channel.
Besides sequential strategies, constructive secret-key ca-
pacity achieving schemes relying on polar codes have been
recently proposed [18], [19] for some of the models studied
in this paper. A brief comparison between sequential schemes
and polar code schemes can be found in [18].
Although, we do not improve the rate-limited WSK capacity
bounds for the discrete source model, we provide an achiev-
ability scheme that might be easier to translate into practical
1We mean that the key-generation can be performed by the succession of
two protocols, one, free from any secrecy constraint, dealing with reliability,
and the other dealing with secrecy. A stronger result would be that optimizing
both protocols independently, in a sense defined in Section III-D, leads to the
best possible key-generation strategy. In Section V, we prove that this stronger
result holds in some scenarios.
2Note that the achievability scheme of [9, Theorem 4.1], which only
holds for Gaussians sources and when there is no side information at the
eavesdropper, is very close to the sequential approach that we study, even
though their model is different in that it deals with a quantized source and
unrestricted public communication.
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2designs. Specifically, we show that sequential strategies, that
are known to be optimal for rate-unlimited public communi-
cation, are also optimal for rate-limited communication. We
however also qualify the robustness of sequential strategies
to rate-limited public communication, as we show in this
case that it may not be optimal to achieve the reconciliation
capacity in a sequential strategy. That is, reliability and secrecy
can be handled successively but not necessarily independently,
thereby limiting the coding scheme flexibility. The main
contributions of this work are:
• an alternative achievability scheme that separates reliabil-
ity and secrecy by means of a reconciliation protocol and
a privacy amplification step performed with extractors,
which achieves
(i) the best known bound of the two-way one-round rate-
limited WSK capacity for degraded sources in Theo-
rem 4.1;
(ii) the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity in Theorem 4.2
(this extends [1], which only considers degraded
sources) ;
(iii) the two-way one-round rate-limited SK capacity (no
side information at the eavesdropper) in Theorem 4.3;
As a side result, we extend the bounds for a discrete
source model in [4], to the case of a continuous source
model in Corollary 4.1 (the case of the one-way rate-
limited WSK capacity is treated in [20], but only for
degraded sources) ;
• scenarios for which achieving the reconciliation capacity
is optimal in a sequential key-generation strategy, as it
is not necessarily the case in general when constraints
are imposed on public communication. Such results are
important to obtain a flexible coding scheme; Specifically,
we treat the case of
(i) the two-way rate-limited SK capacity in Section V-A;
(ii) the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity for degraded
binary symmetric sources in Section V-B;
(iii) the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity for degraded
Gaussian sources in Section V-C;
As side results, we obtain a characterization of the rate-
limited reconciliation capacity in Proposition 5.1, which
corresponds to the best trade-off between the length of
the sequence shared by Alice and Bob after reconciliation
and the quantity of information publicly exchanged; we
also obtain a closed-form expression of the one-way
WSK capacity for degraded binary symmetric sources
with Proposition 5.3, as illustrated in Example 5.1.
Our proofs techniques mainly rely on the analysis of ran-
domness extraction with extractors, Wyner-Ziv coding, and a
fine analysis with robust typicality [21] to extend the discrete
case to a continuous setting. The determination of the one-
way WSK capacity for degraded binary symmetric sources
relies on perhaps less standard techniques, as we use the Krein-
Milman Theorem to simplify a convex optimization problem
under convex constraints.
We note that our model and our analysis rely on restrictive
assumptions.
• Our analysis only deals with asymptotic rates. We thus
do not provide directly applicable results, but rather some
insight for practical applications into the optimality or
non-optimality of a sequential strategy in the case of
rate-limited public communication. Specifically, we show
that sequential strategies remain optimal in most cases
for rate-limited communication, but unlike the case of
rate-unlimited communication, achieving the reconcilia-
tion capacity in a sequential strategy is not necessarily
optimal.
• We consider an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) source. While this assumption is not necessarily
satisfied in practical settings, it remains realistic as shown
in [22], in which an i.i.d. source is induced in an indoor
wireless environment.
• We assume the existence of an authenticated public
channel. In practice, a solution to ensure this would be to
have the legitimate users share a secret seed, which size
can be chosen in the order of the logarithm of the length
of the message [2], [23].
Note that for the finite-length regime in the case of rate-
unlimited communication, a lower and an upper bound for
achievable secret-key rates are provided in [24] for an arbitrary
source (an analysis of privacy amplification is also provided
in [25]), and an achievable secret-key rate is derived in [22]
for i.i.d. sources. However, whether a sequential strategy is
optimal for the finite-length regime remains an open question.
Note also that there exists works dealing with related mod-
els, that do not require such assumptions. For instance, [26]
provides a non-asymptotic practical secret key-generation
scheme for a non-memoryless source model, in which the
legitimate users observe discrete components that are close
with respect to certain metrics, and the eavesdropper has
no observations of the source, with the assumption of one-
way public communication over an unauthenticated channel
with unlimited capacity. Privacy amplification is also treated
for a non-asymptotic regime in [27] by means of malleable
extractors [27], [28], when the legitimate users observe the
same component of a non-memoryless source and the eaves-
dropper observes a correlated component of the source, with
the assumption of two-way one-round communication over an
unauthenticated channel with unlimited capacity. Such models
are less general that the ones studied in this paper since
the observations of the legitimate users are constrained to be
equal or close to each other; however, they offer in return
more practical solutions as they free themselves from the
aforementioned assumptions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section III, we introduce the problem and provide some back-
ground on the topic. Specifically, we formally introduce the
problem studied in Section III-A, and recall known bounds for
the secret-key capacity in Section III-B. In Section III-C, we
describe the two steps of a sequential strategy and recall known
bounds achieved by such a strategy. In Section III-D, we
introduce the notion of independence between the two steps of
a sequential strategy, when constraints are imposed on public
communication. In Section IV, we prove that the sequential
application of reconciliation and privacy amplification with
extractors is an optimal key-generation strategy. In Section V,
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Fig. 1. Source model for secret-key generation
we provide scenarios for which these two phases can be
treated independently of each other. Specifically, we provide
the case of the two-way SK capacity in Section V-A, the one-
way WSK capacity for degraded binary symmetric sources in
Section V-B, and the one-way WSK capacity for degraded
Gaussian sources in Section V-C. All proofs are gathered in
the appendices to streamline presentation.
II. NOTATION
Consider p, q ∈ R. We define the following associative and
commutative operation p ? q , p(1 − q) + (1 − p)q; observe
that [0, 1] is closed with respect to ?. We define the integer
interval Jp, qK, as the set of integers between bpc and dqe. We
define [p]+ as max(0, p). We denote the Bernoulli distribution
with parameter p ∈ [0, 1] by B(p), and for any p ∈ [0, 1], we
define p¯ , 1 − p. Finally, we note Hb(·) the binary entropy
function.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BACKGROUND
A. Source Model for Secret Key-Generation
As illustrated in Figure 1, a source model for secret-
key generation represents a situation in which two legitimate
users, Alice and Bob, and one eavesdropper, Eve, observe the
realizations of a memoryless source (MS) (XYZ, pXY Z), that
can be either discrete (DMS) or continuous (CMS). The three
components X , Y and Z, are observed by Alice, Bob, and Eve,
respectively. The MS is assumed to be outside the control of all
parties, but its statistics are known. Alice and Bob’s objective
is to process their observations and agree on a key K, about
which Eve should have no information. We assume a two-way
one-round communication between Alice and Bob, that is, we
suppose that Alice first sends a message to Bob, and that in
return Bob sends a message to Alice.3 We also assume that
the messages are exchanged over an authenticated noiseless
public channel with limited rate; in others words, Eve has
total access to Alice and Bob’s messages, but cannot tamper
with the messages over the channel. We now formally define
a key-generation strategy.
Definition 3.1. A
(
2nR, n,R1, R2
)
key-generation strategy Sn
for a source model with MS (XYZ, pXY Z) consists of
• a key alphabet K = q1, 2nRy;
• two alphabets A, B respectively used by Alice and Bob
to communicate over the public channel;
3One could also suppose that Bob is the one who sends messages, in which
case one only needs to exchange the role of X and Y in the following.
• two encoding functions f0 : Xn → A, g0 : Yn×A → B;
• two functions κa : Xn × B → K, κb : Yn ×A → K;
and operates as follows.
• Alice observes Xn while Bob observes Y n;
• Alice transmits A = f0(Xn) subject to H(A) 6 nR1;
• Bob transmits B = g0(Y n, A) subject to H(B) 6 nR2;
• Alice computes K = κa(Xn, B) while Bob computes
Kˆ = κb(Y
n, A).
The performance of a
(
2nR, n,R1, R2
)
key-generation
strategy Sn is measured in terms of the average probability
of error between the key K generated by Alice and the key
Kˆ generated by Bob
Pe(Sn) , P[K 6= Kˆ|Sn],
in terms of the information leakage to the eavesdropper
L(Sn) , I(K;ZnAB|Sn),
and in terms of the uniformity of the key
U(Sn) , log
⌈
2nR
⌉−H(K|Sn).
Definition 3.2. A WSK rate R is achievable for a source model
if there exists a sequence of
(
2nR, n,R1, R2
)
key-generation
strategies {Sn}n>1 such that
lim
n→∞Pe(Sn) = 0 (reliability),
lim
n→∞L(Sn) = 0 (strong secrecy),
lim
n→∞U(Sn) = 0 (strong uniformity).
Moreover, the WSK capacity of a source model with MS
(XYZ, pXY Z) is the supremum of achievable WSK rates,
and is denoted by CWSK. In the following, we also consider
situations in which the eavesdropper has access to the public
messages exchanged by Alice and Bob, but has no side
information Zn. In such cases, the WSK capacity is simply
called the secret-key (SK) capacity and is denoted by CSK.
Remark 3.1. As shown in [17], the security criterion L(Sn)
in Definition 3.2 is equivalent to a definition proposed in [17]
and inspired by semantic security for computationally bounded
eavesdropper [29]. In our case, the definition in [17] trans-
lates to
max
A,f
(
P [A(Zn, A,B) = f(K)]− 1|f(K)|
)
,
where the maximization is over any computationally un-
bounded adversaryA and any function f . It means that for any
A and f , the probability that an adversary A recovers f(K)
from (Zn, A,B) should not be better than the probability of
guessing f(K), only knowing its length |f(K)|.
B. Known Bounds for CWSK and CSK
For convenience, we recall known results regarding the
model described in Section III-A. Note that these results only
hold for DMS.
4Theorem 3.1 ( [4, Theorems 2.5, 2.6]). Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be
a DMS.
(a) For R1, R2 ∈ R+, the two-way one-round WSK capacity
satisfies
CWSK(R1, R2) > RWSK(R1, R2),
where
RWSK(R1, R2) , max
U,V
(
[I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U)]+
+[I(X;V |U)− I(Z;V |U)]+)
subject to R1 > I(X;U)− I(Y ;U),
R2 > I(Y ;V |U)− I(X;V |U),
U—X—Y Z, V—Y U—XZ,
|U|6 |X |+2, |V|6 |Y|.
(b) For R1 ∈ R+, the one-way WSK capacity is
CWSK(R1, 0) = max
U,V
(I(Y ;V |U)− I(Z;V |U))
subject to R1 > I(X;V )− I(Y ;V ),
U—V—X—Y Z,
|U|, |V|6 |X |+2.
Corollary 3.1 ( [4, Theorems 2.2, 2.3, 2.4]). Let (XY, pXY )
be a DMS.
(a) For R1, R2 ∈ R+, the two-way one-round SK capacity is
CSK(R1, R2) = max
U,V
(I(Y ;U) + I(X;V |U))
subject to R1 > I(X;U)− I(Y ;U),
R2 > I(Y ;V |U)− I(X;V |U),
U—X—Y , V—Y U—X,
|U|6 |X |+2, |V|6 |Y|.
(b) For R1 ∈ R+, the one-way SK capacity is
CSK(R1, 0) = max
U
I(Y ;U)
subject to R1 > I(X;U)− I(Y ;U),
U—X—Y,
|U|6 |X |+1.
C. Sequential Strategy
In the following, we use the term sequential key-generation
strategy, for a key-generation strategy consisting of the succes-
sion of a reconciliation protocol and a privacy amplification
with extractors.
1) Reconciliation: During the reconciliation phase, Alice
and Bob send messages to each other over an authenticated
public channel with limited rate. Alice and Bob then process
their observations to agree on a common bit sequence S. At
this stage the sequence is not subject to any secrecy constraint.
Formally, a two-way one-round rate-limited reconciliation
protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 3.3. Let R1, R2 ∈ R+. A rate-limited reconciliation
protocol Rn(R1, R2), noted Rn for convenience, for a source
model with MS (XY, pXY ) consists of
• an alphabet S = J1,MK;
• two alphabets A, B respectively used by Alice and Bob
to communicate over the public channel;
• two encoding functions f : Xn → A, g : Yn ×A → B;
• two functions ηa : Xn × B → S , ηb : Yn ×A → S;
and operates as follows
• Alice observes Xn while Bob observes Y n;
• Alice transmits A = f(Xn) subject to H(A) 6 nR1;
• Bob transmits B = g(Y n, A) subject to H(B) 6 nR2;
• Alice computes S = ηa(Xn, B) while bob computes Sˆ =
ηb(Y
n, A).
The reliability performance of a reconciliation protocol is
measured in terms of the average probability of error
Pe(Rn) , P[S 6= Sˆ|Rn].
In addition, since the reconciliation protocol, which generates
the common sequence S, is followed by the privacy amplifica-
tion step to generate a secret-key, it is desirable to leak as little
information as possible over the public channel. As in [16] we
define the reconciliation rate of a reconciliation protocol as
R(Rn) , 1
n
[H(S|Rn)−H(AB|Rn)] .
Definition 3.4. For a given (R1, R2), a reconciliation rate
R is achievable, if there exists a sequence of rate-limited
reconciliation protocols {Rn}n>1 such that
lim
n→∞Pe(Rn) = 0 and limn→∞R(Rn) > R.
Moreover, the two-way one-round rate-limited reconciliation
capacity Crec(R1, R2) of a MS (XY, pXY ) is the supremum
of achievable reconciliation rates.
Intuitively, the reconciliation capacity characterizes the best
trade-off between the length of the sequence shared by Alice
and Bob after reconciliation and the quantity of information
publicly exchanged.
2) Privacy amplification: During the privacy amplification
phase, Alice and Bob generate their secret key by applying a
deterministic function, on which they publicly agreed ahead
of time, to their common sequence S obtained after recon-
ciliation. This phase is performed with extractors [30], which
are functions that take as input a sequence of n arbitrarily
distributed bits and output a sequence of k nearly uniformly
distributed bits, using another input of d truly uniformly
distributed bits. The following theorem provides a lower bound
on the size of the key, on which the legitimate users agree.
5Theorem 3.2 ( [13], [16, Theorem 4.6]). Let S ∈ {0, 1}n
be the RV that represents the common sequence shared by
Alice and Bob, and let E be the RV that represents the total
knowledge about S available to Eve. Let e be a particular
realization of E. If Alice and Bob know that
H∞(S|E = e) > γn, for some γ ∈]0, 1[,
then there exists an extractor g : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}k
with d 6 nδ(n) and k > n(γ − δ(n)), where δ(n) satisfies
limn→+∞ δ(n) = 0.
Moreover, if Ud is a RV uniformly distributed on {0, 1}d and
Alice and Bob choose K = g(S,Ud) as their secret key, then
H(K|Ud, E = e) > k − δ∗(n),
with δ∗(n) = 2−
√
n/logn (k +
√
n/log n).
Note that, the size d of the uniformly distributed input
sequence is negligible, compared to n, so that the effect on
the rate of public communication is negligible. Moreover,
extractors that extract almost the entire min-entropy of the in-
put S and require comparatively negligible amount of uniform
randomness can be efficiently constructed [30].
3) Known Results Concerning Sequential Strategy: For a
DMS, in the absence of rate constraint between Alice and Bob,
i.e. R1, R2 = +∞, [13], [16, Theorem 4.7] state that one can
handle reliability and secrecy successively to achieve the WSK
capacity CWSK(+∞,+∞), by means of a reconciliation step,
and a privacy amplification step. This result is extended to the
case of one-way rate-limited communication, i.e. R1 ∈ R+
and R2 = 0, for a degraded DMS in [1].
D. Independence Between Reconciliation and Privacy Ampli-
fication
In this section, we define a notion of independence between
reconciliation and privacy amplification, when constraints hold
on the public communication rate. As explained earlier, we
would like to ensure that reliability and secrecy can be handled
not only successively but also independently, to obtain a
flexible coding scheme. We first recall that in the case of one-
way rate-limited communication, the reconciliation capacity is
given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 ([1]). Let (XY, pXY ) be a DMS. Let R1 ∈
R+. The reconciliation capacity Crec(R1, 0) is given by
Crec(R1, 0) = CSK(R1, 0).
As shown in Example 3.1, unlike the case of rate-unlimited
communication, in the case of rate-limited communication, it
is not necessarily optimal to first achieve the reconciliation
capacity in Proposition 3.1 and then to perform privacy
amplification. In other words, if a sequential strategy is
known to achieve the secret-key capacity, it does not tell us at
which rate we should perform the reconciliation step. In the
following, we say that reconciliation and privacy amplification
are independent if achieving the reconciliation capacity in
a sequential strategy leads to achieving the secret-key capacity.
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Fig. 2. Example of a binary DMS studied in Example 3.1
Example 3.1. Consider the scenario presented in Figure 2,
in which |X |= |Y|= |Z|= 2, X—Y—Z forms a Markov
chain, and X ∼ B(p). We assume a one-way rate-limited
public communication, i.e R1 ∈ R and R2 = 0. We set
the parameters as follows. R1 = H(X|Y )/3, p = 0.23,
β1 = 0.01, β2 = 0.03, γ1 = 0.03 and γ2 = 0.01.
We know by [1] that a sequential strategy achieves the WSK
capacity CWSK(R1, 0). Moreover, we can show that
CWSK(R1, 0) = max
α1,α2
(f − g)(α1, α2),
subject to (h− f)(α1, α2) = R1, (1)
Crec(R1, 0) = max
α1,α2
f(α1, α2),
subject to (h− f)(α1, α2) = R1, (2)
where
f(α1, α2) , Hb(py)− puHb(a)− p¯uHb(b),
g(α1, α2) , Hb(pz)− puHb(c)− p¯uHb(d),
h(α1, α2) , Hb(p)− puHb(α1)− p¯uHb(α2),
with pu = (α¯2− p)/(α¯2−α1), py = p¯β¯1 + pβ2, pz = pyγ¯1 +
p¯yγ2, a = α1β2 + α¯1β¯1, b = α2β¯1 + α¯2β2, c = γ¯1a + γ2a¯,
d = γ¯1b+ γ2b¯.
Numerically,
CWSK(R1, 0) > 0.050 > 0.045 > (f − g)(α∗1, α∗2),
where (α∗1, α
∗
2) achieves Crec(R1, 0). Hence, for this example,
achieving the reconciliation capacity in a sequential key-
generation is not optimal and incurs a rate loss above 10%.
Remark 3.2. Deriving (1) and (2) is not straightforward. We
used Proposition 5.2 given in the following sections, which
shows that equality holds in the public communication rate
constraint (3) and that |U|6 |X |.
In Section IV, for R1, R2 ∈ R+, we study the achievability
of RWSK(R1, R2), CWSK(R1, 0), given in Theorem 3.1 and
CSK(R1, R2) given in Corollary 3.1, with a sequential key-
generation strategy. Moreover, in Section V, we identify
scenarios for which reconciliation and privacy are independent
in the sense defined in this section.
IV. SEQUENTIAL STRATEGIES ACHIEVE THE BEST KNOW
BOUNDS OF CWSK AND CSK
In this section, we provide one of our main result. That
is, the successive combination of reconciliation and privacy
amplification, achieves the best known rates of the secret-key
capacity (under the assumption of degraded sources in the case
of two-way communication), when constraints are imposed on
the public communication. As a side result, we extend known
bounds of CWSK and CSK for DMS to the case of CMS.
6Theorem 4.1. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a MS such that
X—Y—Z. For R1, R2 ∈ R+, all WSK rates R that satisfy
R < RWSK(R1, R2)
are achievable with sequential key-generation strategies.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 4.1. Note that we assume X—Y—Z. For two-way
communication, the necessity of this hypothesis might be an
inherent weakness of a scheme that consists of a successive
design of reconciliation and privacy amplification, rather than
a joint design as in [4] (see the proof in Appendix A for more
details). Observe, however, that for a one-way public commu-
nication, in Theorem 4.2, this assumption is not required.
Theorem 4.2. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a MS. For R1 ∈ R+, all
WSK rates R that satisfy
R < CWSK(R1, 0)
are achievable with sequential key-generation strategies.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 4.3. Let (XY, pXY ) be a MS. For R1, R2 ∈ R+,
all SK rates R that satisfy
R < CSK(R1, R2)
are achievable with sequential key-generation strategies.
We omit the proof of Theorem 4.3, which is similar to the
one of Theorem 4.1 without the RV Z.
Note that putting constraints on the public communication
leads to auxiliary random variables in the expression of the
secret-key capacity and the reconciliation capacity, as seen in
Section III. Hence, as demonstrated in Example 3.1, auxiliary
random variables that achieve the reconciliation capacity, may
not achieve the secret-key capacity. In other words, reliability
and secrecy can be handled successively, but cannot neces-
sarily be treated independently, as defined in Section III-D.
Nevertheless, in the next section, we identify scenarios for
which reconciliation and privacy amplification can be treated
independently.
As a side result, we have extended known bounds for
the secret-key capacity for DMS to the case of CMS. We
summarize this result in the following corollary, which is
directly deduced from Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
Corollary 4.1. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a MS.
(a) Assume that X—Y—Z. For R1, R2 ∈ R+, the two-way
WSK achievable bound RWSK(R1, R2) given in Theo-
rem 3.1.a, remains valid for a CMS.
(b) For R1 ∈ R+, the expression of the one-way WSK capacity
CWSK(R1, 0) given in Theorem 3.1.b, remains valid for
a CMS.
(c) For R1, R2 ∈ R+, the two-way SK capacity CSK(R1, R2)
given in Corollary 3.1, remains valid for a CMS.
V. SCENARIOS FOR WHICH INDEPENDENCE HOLDS
BETWEEN RELIABILITY AND SECRECY
As seen in the Example 3.1, achieving the reconciliation
capacity might not lead to achieving the secret-key capacity.
In this section, we identify special cases for which indepen-
dence holds between reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Specifically, we prove that independence holds for the two-way
one-round SK capacity, the one-way WSK capacity in the case
of binary symmetric degraded sources, and the one-way WSK
capacity in the case of Gaussian degraded sources. As a side
result, we obtain an expression for the two-way rate-limited
reconciliation capacity and a closed-form expression for the
secret-key capacity CWSK(R1, 0) in the case of degraded
binary symmetric sources.
A. Two-Way Rate-Limited SK capacity
In this section, we consider the two-way rate-limited SK ca-
pacity. That is, the eavesdropper has no correlated observation
of the source.
We first show that the two-way rate-limited SK capacity is
equal to the two-way rate-limited reconciliation capacity in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Let (XY, pXY ) be a MS. For R1, R2 ∈ R+,
the rate-limited reconciliation capacity Crec(R1, R2) is
Crec(R1, R2) = CSK(R1, R2).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Hence, by Proposition 5.1, the auxiliary random variables
that achieve the reconciliation capacity, also achieve the secret-
key capacity; combined with Theorem 4.3, we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Let (XY, pXY ) be a MS and R1, R2 ∈ R+.
The two-way rate-limited SK capacity CSK(R1, R2) is achiev-
able by a sequential strategy, moreover, reconciliation and
privacy amplification steps can be handled independently, as
defined in Section III-D.
B. One-Way Rate-Limited WSK capacity for Degraded Binary
Symmetric Sources
In this section, we assume a degraded DMS. We first
refine Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 3.1.b in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.2. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a DMS such that
X—Y—Z. Assume R1 ∈ R+ and R2 = 0. We tighten the
rate constraint in (3), (5) and the range constraint in (4), (6)
as follows.
(a) The one-way rate-limited reconciliation capacity is
Crec(R1, 0) = max
U
I(Y ;U)
subject to R1 = I(X;U |Y ), (3)
U—X—Y,
|U|6 |X |. (4)
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CWSK(R1, 0) = max
U
(I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U))
subject to R1 = I(X;U |Y ), (5)
U—X—Y—Z,
|U|6 |X |. (6)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remark 5.1. The expression of the WSK capacity in Proposi-
tion 5.2.b is obtained from Theorem 3.1.b and is due to Watan-
abe [20]. We refine this result by proving that equality holds in
the rate constraint and by improving the range constraint of U;
The argument used to show the equality in the rate constraint
of Propositions 5.2.a and 5.2.b, is one that applies to various
convex maximization problems: the maximum principle (see
Appendix D). This refinement is critical for the analysis of
binary sources, especially to solve the optimization problem
for the WSK capacity in Proposition 5.3, and thus to determine
the WSK capacity for degraded binary symmetric sources in
Example 5.1.
Remark 5.2. As soon as R1 is at least H(X|Y ), Crec(R1, 0)
(resp. CWSK(R1, 0)) attains the same maximum I(X;Y ) (resp.
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)) as in the case R1 = +∞.
The solution of the maximization problem in Proposi-
tion 5.2.b can be obtained explicitly, when the source has
symmetry properties.
Proposition 5.3. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a DMS such that
X—Y—Z. Assume that |X |= 2 and let R1 ∈ R∗+.
If the channels pY |X and pZ|X are symmetric [31], then the
auxiliary RV U achieving CWSK(R1, 0) in Proposition 5.2.b,
is such that the test-channel pU |X is a BSC with parameter
β0, with β0, any of the two symmetric solutions of
R1 = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ).
Proof: See Appendix E.
Although the result stated in Proposition 5.3 seems intuitive
and non-surprising, the proof is not straightforward, as a
crucial step is the improvements proposed in Proposition 5.2.
Hence, if the channels pY |X and pZ|X are symmetric, by
Proposition 5.3, the auxiliary RV U achieving Crec(R1, 0)
in Proposition 5.2.a also achieves CWSK(R1, 0) in Propo-
sition 5.2.b; combined with Theorem 4.2, we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 5.2. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a DMS such that
X—Y—Z and |X |= 2. Let R1 ∈ R∗+. We assume the channels
pY |X and pZ|X to be symmetric. The one-way rate-limited
WSK capacity CWSK(R1, 0) is achievable by a sequential strat-
egy, moreover, reconciliation and privacy amplification steps
can be handled independently, as defined in Section III-D.
The following example illustrates Proposition 5.3 and
Corollary 5.2.
Example 5.1. As depicted in Figure 3, assume that X and Y
(respectively Y and Z) are connected by a binary symmetric
channel (BSC) with crossover probability p (respectively q).
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p q
Fig. 3. Binary DMS studied in Example 5.1
We also assume X ∼ B(1/2) to obtain simpler expressions;
however, the application of Proposition 5.3 remains valid for
X ∼ B(α), α ∈ [0, 1]. By Proposition 5.3, the reconciliation
capacity is
Crec(R1, 0) =
{
1−Hb(p ? β0), if R1 6 H(X|Y ),
1−Hb(p), if R1 > H(X|Y ),
and the WSK capacity is
CWSK(R1, 0) ={
Hb (p ? β0 ? q)−Hb(p ? β0), if R1 6 H(X|Y ),
Hb(p ? q)−Hb(p), if R1 > H(X|Y ),
with β0, any of the two symmetric solutions of the equation
Hb(p ? β0)−Hb(β0) = R1.
Figure 5 (resp. Figure 4) illustrates Remark 5.2 and the fact
that the reconciliation capacity Crec(R1, 0) (resp. the secret
key-capacity CWSK(R1, 0)) is monotonically increasing in the
communication rate constraint.
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Fig. 4. Reconciliation capacity Crec(R1, 0)
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Fig. 5. WSK capacity CWSK(R1, 0) (q = 0.2)
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Fig. 6. Binary erasure channel studied in Example 5.1
Corollary 5.2 states that choosing a test-channel pU |X
as a BSC with parameter β0, achieves Crec(R1, 0) and
CWSK(R1, 0), so that reconciliation and privacy amplification
can be designed independently. Consequently, for any other
channel pZ|Y , as long as pZ|X stays symmetric, the recon-
ciliation capacity and the optimal reconciliation protocol for
sequential key-generation remains the same. It is for instance
the case if we choose pZ|Y as a binary erasure channel (BEC),
as depicted in Figure 6. Moreover, in this case, Proposition 5.3
still allows us to determine the WSK capacity:
C
(erasure)
WSK (R1, 0) =
{
(1−Hb(p ? β0)), if R1 6 H(X|Y ),
(1−Hb(p)), if R1 > H(X|Y ),
where  is the erasure probability characterizing pZ|Y .
Remark 5.3. We can show that the sequential strategy used in
this section can also be applied to similar models for biometric
secrecy [32].
C. One-Way Rate-Limited WSK Capacity for Degraded Gaus-
sian Sources
In this section, we consider a degraded Gaussian MS with
one-way rate-limited public communication. We assume that
X , Y , and Z are zero-mean correlated Gaussian sources on R,
and that Alice, Bob, and Eve know the covariance matrix of
(X,Y, Z). We first refine the reconciliation capacity and the
secret-key capacity to give the counterpart of Proposition 5.2.
We then provide the reconciliation capacity and the secret-
key capacity, and show that reconciliation and privacy ampli-
fication can be treated independently. We also briefly discuss
the performance of vector quantization compared to scalar
quantization for the reconciliation step, thereby providing a
counterpart of Remark 5.2.
Proposition 5.4. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a zero-mean Gaussian
MS such that X—Y—Z. Assume R1 ∈ R+ and R2 = 0.
(a) The one-way rate-limited reconciliation capacity is
Crec(R1, 0) = max
U
I(Y ;U)
subject to R1 = I(X;U |Y ), (7)
U—X—Y, .
(b) The one-way rate-limited WSK capacity is
CWSK(R1, 0) = max
U
(I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U))
subject to R1 = I(X;U |Y ),
U—X—Y—Z,
Proposition 5.4 follows from Proposition 5.5.
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Fig. 7. Reconciliation capacity Crec(R1, 0) for different correlation coeffi-
cients ρXY
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Fig. 8. WSK capacity CWSK(R1, 0), for different correlation coefficients
ρXY (ρXZ = 0.1, ρY Z = 0.4)
Proposition 5.5. Assume that (XYZ, pXY Z) is a degraded
zero-mean Gaussian source. Let R1 ∈ R+.
The auxiliary RV U achieving Crec(R1, 0) in Proposi-
tion 5.4.a is a zero-mean Gaussian with variance
σ0 , σx
(
1 + (1− ρXY )(e2R1 − 1)−1
)
that satisfies the rate-constraint (7), where ρXY is the cor-
relation coefficient between X and Y . Moreover, the same
auxiliary RV U achieves CWSK(R1, 0) in Proposition 5.4.b.
(a) The one-way rate-limited reconciliation capacity is given
by
Crec(R1, 0) =
1
2
log2
1− (ρXY e−R1)2
1− ρ2XY
.
(b) The one-way rate-limited WSK capacity is
CWSK(R1, 0) =
1
2
log2
(1− ρ2Y Z)(1− ρ2XZ)− (ρXY − ρY ZρXZ)2 e−2R1
(1− ρ2Y Z)(1− ρ2XZ)− (ρXY − ρY ZρXZ)2
.
Proof: (b) is due to Watanabe [20], and the proof of (a)
is similar to the one of (b).
9Proposition 5.5 states that both arguments of the maximum
for the auxiliary RV U , in (a) and (b) of Proposition 5.4
are identical; combined with Theorem 4.2, we deduce the
following corollary.
Corollary 5.3. Assume that (XYZ, pXY Z) is a degraded
zero-mean Gaussian source. Let R1 ∈ R+. The one-way
rate-limited WSK capacity CWSK(R1, 0) is achievable by a
sequential strategy, moreover, reconciliation and privacy am-
plification steps can be handled independently, as defined in
Section III-D.
As shown by Proposition 5.5.a (resp. Proposition 5.5.b), and
as illustrated in Figure 7 (resp. Figure 8), the reconciliation
capacity (resp. the WSK capacity) does not reach I(X;Y )
(resp. I(X;Y )−I(X;Z)) when R1 exceed a certain value. As
mentioned in [20] and Remark 5.2, unlike the case of discrete
random variables, Crec(R1, 0) (resp. CWSK(R1, 0)) can only
approach I(X;Y ) (resp. I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)) asymptotically.
Nevertheless, we show in the following proposition a contin-
uous counterpart of Remark 5.2.
The achievability of CWSK(R1, 0) with our sequential strat-
egy is based on Wyner-Ziv coding. For a practical imple-
mentation, additional structure needs to be introduced, for
instance with vector quantization. Since scalar quantization is
the simplest and often the most computationally efficient type
of quantization, it is natural to ask how scalar quantization
performs compared to vector quantization. We answer this
question in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.6. Let n ∈ N∗, and a > 0. Define U as a
uniformly quantized version of X . Specifically,
∀k ∈ J1, nK, pU (uk) , ∫ tk+1
tk
pX(x)dx, with tk , a(2 k−1n−1−1).
If n is large enough, then
|I(X;Y )− I(Y ;U)|6 (a) + a ·Keh(X|Y )−R1 ,
where R1 is the communication rate constraint, K is a
constant, and (a) decreases exponentially fast to zero as a
goes to infinity.
Proof: See Appendix F.
Proposition 5.6 gives a continuous counterpart of Re-
mark 5.2. Indeed, when R1 > h(X|Y ), by Proposition 5.6, if
X is quantized finely enough, then I(Y ;U) approach I(X;Y )
exponentially fast as R1 increases.
Hence, the improvement of vector quantization compared
to scalar quantization decays rapidly as the communication
rate increases beyond h(X|Y ). Note that, in practice, we
can optimize the scalar quantization, so that the loss could
be even smaller than predicted by Proposition 5.6. Figure 9
illustrates this point by comparing the reconciliation capacity
with numerical values of achievable rates obtained when
X is scalar-quantized.4 Nevertheless, for low communication
rates, Figure 9 shows that vector quantization improves the
4We have increased the number of interval of quantization of X from 2
to 15 and chosen their bounds by a standard gradient method to maximize
I(XQ;Y ).
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Fig. 9. Reconciliation capacity obtained for a scalar quantization of X with
ρXY = 0.75, h(X|Y ) ≈ 1
performance; in this case, we could implement, for instance,
trellis coded vector quantization (TCVQ) [33].
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that the the best known bounds for the
one-way rate-limited capacity are achievable by a sequential
strategy that separates reliability and secrecy thanks to a
reconciliation step followed by a privacy amplification step
with extractors; in the case of two-way communication, the
sequential design seems to suffer a loss of performance
compared to the joint design and similar secret key rates have
only been established for degraded sources or when there is no
side information at the eavesdropper (SK capacity). We have
also qualified robustness of sequential strategy to rate-limited
communication, by showing that achieving the reconciliation
capacity in a sequential strategy is, unlike the case of rate-
unlimited communication, not necessarily optimal. We further
provide scenarios for which it stays optimal. As a side result,
we have extended known bounds of the WSK capacity for
a discrete source model to the case of a continuous source
model, and derive a closed-form expression of the one-way
rate-limited capacity for degraded binary symmetric sources.
A strength of sequential key-generation is to easily translate
into practical designs. Even more interestingly, the proposed
scheme can be made very flexible with the following modifi-
cations.
1) Rate-compatible reconciliation: we can adapt to the
characteristics of the legitimate users by the use of rate-
compatible LDPC codes, to perform the reconciliation phase,
as demonstrated in [34], [35]. Note, however, that vector
quantization might be required, which could complexify the
reconciliation phase.
2) Rate-compatible privacy amplification: Privacy amplifi-
cation can also be performed with universal families of hash
functions, in which case the counterpart of Theorem 3.2 is
found in [12].5 Hence, one can design privacy amplification
5 However, it requires more random bits than extractors, on the order of n
random bits, since functions must be chosen at random in universal families.
Consequently, our scheme needs to be adapted to account for it.
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methods easily adjustable to the characteristics of the eaves-
dropper’s observations, if we make k vary in the following uni-
versal family of hash functionsH = {GF(2n)→ {0, 1}k, x 7→
(k bits of the product xy)|y ∈ GF(2n)}, where the k bits are
fixed but their position can be chosen arbitrarily [36].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
1) Discrete case: Let  > 0. Let R1, R2 ∈ R+. Let
m,n ∈ N, and define N , nm. Let k ∈ N to be determined
later. Consider a sequential key-distillation strategy SN that
consists of
• m repetitions of a reconciliation protocol Rn based on
Wyner-Ziv coding. The protocolRn operates as described
in Appendix C-B. Hence, after one repetition of the
protocol, Alice obtains Sn , UnVˆ n, whereas Bob
has Sˆn , UˆnV n and P[Sˆn 6= Sn|Rn] 6 Pe(, n).6
In addition, the information disclosed over the pub-
lic channel during the m repetitions of the reconcilia-
tion protocol is upper bounded by log|A|m+ log|B|m=
N(I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y )+I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;X|U)+r0()),
with lim→0 r0() = 0.7 An additional round of rec-
onciliation is then performed to ensure P[(Sˆn)m 6=
(Sn)m|Rn] 6 δe(m), where limm→∞ δe(m) = 0, for
any fixed n. We note log|C|m the information com-
municated to perform this last step. Hence, the over-
all information disclosed is upper bounded by lrec ,
log(|A|N |B|N |C|m), that is
lrec = N(I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y )
+ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;X|U) + r1(, n)), (8)
with r1(, n) ,
1 + 
n
H(Sn|Sˆn) + r0() (9)
arbitrarily small for n large enough by Fano’s inequality,
so that the communication rates R1 and R2 remain
asymptotically unchanged.
• privacy amplification, based on extractors with output size
k, at the end of which Alice computes her key K ,
g(SN , Ud), while Bob computes Kˆ , g(SˆN , Ud), where
Ud is a sequence of d uniformly distributed random bits.
The total information available to Eve after reconciliation
consists of her observation ZN , the public messages Am and
Bm, respectively sent by Alice and Bob, the public message
Cm, and Ud. The strategy SN is also known to Eve, but we
omit the conditioning on SN for convenience.
We first show that, for a suitable choice of the output size
k, the quantity k −H(K|UdZNAmBmCm) vanishes to zero
for N large enough. Then, we show that the corresponding
WSK rate achieves the lower bound on the WSK capacity of
Theorem 3.1. We first state Lemma 1.1, a refined version of
the results in [13], [16], that is obtained by using the notion
of robust typicality developed in the appendix of [21], to later
extend our result to the continuous case.
6By Appendix C-B, Pe(, n) decreases exponentially to zero as n2 goes
to infinity.
7r0() , 6H(U) + 12H(V |U) by Appendix C-B.
Lemma 1.1 ( [13], [16], Refined version). Consider a DMS
(XZ, pXZ) and define the RV Θ as
Θ ,
{
1 if (Xn, Zn) ∈ T n2(XZ) and Zn ∈ T n (Z),
0 otherwise.
Then, P[Θ = 1] > 1−δ0 (n), with δ0 (n) , 2|SX |e−
2nµX/3 +
2|SXZ |e−2nµXZ/3, where SX , {x ∈ X : p(x) > 0} and
µX , minx∈SX p(x) . Moreover, if zn ∈ T n (Z),
H∞(Xn|Zn = zn,Θ = 1)
> n(H(X|Z)− δ0()) + log(1− δ1 (n)),
where δ0() , H(X|Z) and δ1 (n) , 2|SX,Z |e−
2nµX,Z/6.
Let us start by defining the following RVs
Θ ,

1 if (SN , ZN ) ∈ T m2 (UnV nZn)
and ZN ∈ T m (Zn),
0 otherwise.
Υ ,

1 if H∞(SN |zN , am, bm, cm,Θ = 1)
> H∞(SN |zN ,Θ = 1)− lrec −
√
N,
0 otherwise.
By Lemma 1.1 applied to the DMS (UnVnZn, pUnV nZn),
P[Θ = 1] > 1− δ0 (m), and by [13, Lemma 10], P[Υ = 1] >
1 − 2−
√
N . Hence, P[Υ = 1,Θ = 1] > 1 − δ0 (m) − 2−
√
N ,
and
H(K|UdZNAmBmCm) >
(
1− δ0 (m)− 2−
√
N
)
×H(K|UdZNAmBmCm,Υ = 1,Θ = 1). (10)
To lower bound H(K|UdZNAmBmCm,Υ = 1,Θ = 1), we
first lower bound H∞(SN |zN , am, bm, cm,Θ = 1,Υ = 1) to
be able to use Theorem 3.2. By definition of Υ,
H∞(SN |zN , am, bm, cm,Θ = 1,Υ = 1)
> H∞(SN |ZN = zN ,Θ = 1)− lrec −
√
N
(a)
> m(H(Sn|Zn)− nr2(, n,m))− lrec, (11)
where (a) follows from Lemma 1.1 with
r2(, n,m) , 
H(Sn|Zn)
n
−N−1 log(1− δ1 (m)) +N−1/2.8
(12)
We now lower bound H(Sn|Zn).
H(Sn|Zn)
= H(Sˆn|Zn) +H(Sn|SˆnZn)−H(Sˆn|SnZn)
(b)
> H(Sˆn|Zn)− δ(n)
= I(Y n; Sˆn|Zn) +H(Sˆn|Y nZn)− δ(n)
= H(Y n|Zn)−H(Y n|ZnSˆn) +H(Uˆn|Y nZn)
+H(V n|Y nUˆnZn)− δ(n)
(c)
= nH(Y |Z)−H(Y n|ZnSˆn) +H(Uˆn|Y nZn)− δ(n),
(13)
8The m repetitions of the protocol Rn allow us to link H∞(·) to H(·).
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where (b) follows from Fano’s inequality where
limn→∞ δ(n) = 0 by the exponential decrease of Pe(, n)
with 2n, and (c) holds because V n is a function of (Y nUˆn),
and the Yi’s and Zi’s are i.i.d.. We first lower bound
H(Uˆn|Y nZn).
H(Uˆn|Y nZn)
= H(Un|Y nZn) +H(Uˆn|UnY nZn)−H(Un|UˆnY nZn)
(d)
> H(Un|Y nZn)− δ(n)
> I(Xn;Un|Y nZn)− δ(n)
(e)
= nH(X|Y Z)−H(Xn|Y nZnUn)− δ(n), (14)
where (d) follows from Fano’s inequality where
limn→∞ δ(n) = 0 by the exponential decrease of Pe(, n)
with 2n, and (e) holds since the Xi’s, Yi’s , and Zi’s are
i.i.d.. Then, define
Γ ,
{
1 if (Xn, Un, Y n, Zn) ∈ T n2(XUY Z),
0 otherwise.
∆ ,
{
1 if (Xn, Un) ∈ T n (XU),
0 otherwise.
so that,
H(Xn|Y nZnUn)
6 H(XnΓ∆|Y nZnUn)
= H(Γ∆|Y nZnUn) +H(Xn|Y nZnUnΓ∆)
6 2 +
∑
δ,γ∈{0,1}
P[Γ = γ|∆ = δ]P[∆ = δ]
×H(Xn|Y nZnUn,Γ = γ,∆ = δ)
(f)
6 2 +H(Xn|Y nZnUn,Γ = 1,∆ = 1)
+ n(2δ2 (n) + δ
4
 (n)) log|X |, (15)
where (f) holds since P[∆ = 0] , δ2 (n),9 and P[Γ = 0|∆ =
1] 6 δ4 (n).10 Indeed, we can apply Markov Lemma [37] (see
the version given in [21]), since we have Un—Xn—Y nZn
and for every (xn, yn, zn), p(ynzn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
pY Z|X(yizi|xi).
Then,
H(Xn|Y nZnUn,Γ = 1,∆ = 1)
=
∑
yn,zn,un
p(yn, zn, un|1, 1)H(Xn|yn, zn, un,Γ=1,∆=1)
6
∑
yn,zn,un
p(yn, zn, un|1, 1) log|T n2(X|yn, zn, un)|
6
∑
yn,zn,un
p(yn, zn, un|1, 1)(nH(X|Y ZU)(1 + 2))
6 nH(X|Y ZU)(1 + 2). (16)
Hence, combining (14), (15), and (16), we obtain
H(Uˆn|Y nZn) > n(H(X|Y Z)−H(X|Y ZU)− r3(, n)),
(17)
9We have δ2 (n) 6 Pe(, n) by Appendix C-B.
10By Markov Lemma, we have δ4 (n) , 2|SUXY Z |e−
2nµUXYZ/6.
where
r3(, n) , 2H(X|Y ZU)+ (2δ2 (n) + δ4 (n)) log|X |
+ 2/n+ δ(n)/n. (18)
We now lower bound the term −H(Y n|ZnSˆn) in (13). Define
Γ1 ,
{
1 if (Y n, Uˆn, V n, Zn) ∈ T n2(Y UV Z),
0 otherwise.
∆1 ,
{
1 if (Y n, Uˆn, V n) ∈ T n (Y UV ),
0 otherwise.
We can write
H(Y n|ZnSˆn)
6 H(Y nΓ1∆1|ZnSˆn)
= H(Γ1∆1|ZnSˆn) +H(Y n|ZnSˆnΓ1∆1)
6 2 +
∑
δ1,γ1∈{0,1}
P[Γ1 = γ1|∆1 = δ1]P[∆1 = δ1]
×H(Y n|ZnSˆn,Γ1 = γ1,∆1 = δ1)
(g)
62 +H(Y n|ZnSˆn,Γ1 = 1,∆1 = 1)
+ n(2δ3 (n) + δ
5
 (n)) log|Y|, (19)
where (g) holds since P[∆1 = 0] , δ3 (n),11 and P[Γ1 =
0|∆1 = 1] 6 δ5 (n).12 Indeed, we can apply Markov Lemma,
since we have for every (yn, zn), p(zn|yn) =
n∏
i=1
pZ|Y (zi|yi),
and (UˆnV n)—Y n—Zn, which follows from the assumption
X—Y—Z.13
H(Y n|ZnSˆn,Γ1 = 1,∆1 = 1)
=
∑
zn,sˆn
p(zn, sˆn|1, 1)H(Y n|zn, sˆn,Γ1 = 1,∆1 = 1)
6
∑
zn,sˆn
p(zn, sˆn|1, 1) log|T n2(Y |zn, sˆn)|
6
∑
zn,sˆn
p(zn, sˆn|1, 1)(nH(Y |ZUV )(1 + 2))
6 nH(Y |ZUV )(1 + 2). (20)
Hence by (19), (20),
H(Y n|ZnUnV n) 6 n(H(Y |ZUV ) + r4(, n)), (21)
where
r4(, n) , 2H(Y |ZUV )+ (2δ3 (n) + δ5 (n)) log|Y|+2/n.
(22)
Combining (13), (17), (21),
H(Sn|Zn) > n[H(Y |Z) +H(X|Y Z)−H(X|Y ZU)
−H(Y |ZUV )− r3(, n)− r4(, n)]− δ(n). (23)
11We have δ3 (n) 6 Pe(, n) by Appendix C-B.
12By Markov Lemma, we have δ5 (n) , 2|SUV Y Z |e−
2nµUV Y Z/6.
13Note that the assumption of degraded sources is only necessary here. The
use of this hypothesis is the weakness, at least for two-way communication
(for one-way communication this assumption is not necessary), of a proof that
consists of a successive design of reconciliation and privacy amplification,
rather than a joint design as in [4], where the joint design is exploited to get
the joint typicality of (V n, Y n, Uˆn, Zn).
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Then, remark that
H(Y |Z) +H(X|Y Z)−H(X|Y ZU)−H(Y |ZUV )
= I(Y ;UV |Z) + I(X;U |Y Z)
= H(U |Z) +H(V |UZ)−H(V |UY Z)−H(U |XY Z)
(h)
>H(U |Z) +H(V |UZ)−H(V |UY )−H(U |X)
= I(U ;X)− I(U ;Z)− I(V ;Z|U) + I(V ;Y |U), (24)
where (h) holds because conditioning reduces entropy. Hence,
by (8), (11), (23), and (24)
H∞(SN |zN , am, bm, cm,Θ = 1,Υ = 1)
> N [I(U ;Y ) + I(V ;X|U)− I(U ;Z)− I(V ;Z|U)
− r5(, n,m)], (25)
where
r5(, n,m) , r1(, n) + r2(, n,m)
+ r3(, n) + r4(, n) + δ(n)/n. (26)
Set k to be less than the lower bound in (25) by
√
N :
k , bN [I(U ;Y ) + I(V ;X|U)− I(U ;Z)− I(V ;Z|U)
− r5(,N)]−
√
Nc. (27)
Now with (25) and (27), we can apply Theorem 3.2 to lower
bound H(K|UdZNAmBmCm,Υ = 1,Θ = 1) by k− δ∗(N),
where δ∗(N) = 2−
√
N/logN
(
k +
√
N/logN
)
. Thus, we can
finally lower bound H(K|UdZNAmBmCm) in (10):
H(K|UdZNAmBmCm)
>
(
1− δ0 (m)− 2−
√
N
)
(k − δ∗(N))
= k − r6(, n,m),
where
r6(, n,m) ,
(
1− δ0 (m)− 2−
√
N
)
δ∗(N)
+
(
δ0 (m) + 2
−√N
)
k.
Moreover, the leakage is such that
I(K;UdZ
NAmBmCm)
= H(K)−H(K|UdZNAmBmCm) 6 r6(, n,m), (28)
with r6(, n,m) vanishing to zero for a fixed n as m goes to
infinity. The keys computed by Alice and Bob are asymptoti-
cally the same for a fixed n as m goes to infinity, since
P[K 6= Kˆ] 6 P[(Sn)m 6= (Sˆn)m] 6 δe(m). (29)
Then, by (9), (12), (18), (22), (26), we have that r5(, n,m)
vanishes to zero for n large enough and as m goes to infinity,
thus the secret key rate R , k/N is asymptotically as close
as desired to
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) + I(V ;X|U)− I(V ;Z|U).
Note that it is not exactly the bound proposed in Theorem 3.1.a
for the WSK capacity. We finish the proof as follows. If
I(V ;X|U) 6 I(V ;Z|U), in the reconciliation we set R2 = 0
so that the asymptotic secret key rate is now as close as de-
sired to
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) + [I(V ;X|U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+.
Then, if I(U ;Y ) 6 I(U ;Z), in the reconciliation protocol,
we choose Sn = V n (see the beginning of the proof), and we
assume that UN is provided by a genie to Eve. Consequently,
we obtain instead of Equation (11),
H∞(V N |zN , uN , bm, cm,Θ = 1,Υ = 1)
> m(H(V n|ZnUn)− nr2(, n,m))
−N(I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;X|U)− r1(, n)),
and conclude in the same manner, to obtain an asymptotic
secret key rate as close as desired to
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]+ + [I(V ;X|U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+.
2) Continuous case: We use the following lemma to extend
the result to the continuous case by means of quantization.
Lemma 1.2 ( [38]–[40]). Let X and Y be two real-valued
random variables with probability distribution PX and PY
respectively. Let E∆1 = {Ei}i∈I , F∆2 = {Fj}j∈J be two
partitions of X and Y such that for any i ∈ I,PX(Ei) = ∆1,
for any j ∈ J ,PY (Fj) = ∆2, where ∆1,∆2 > 0. Let X∆1 ,
Y∆2 be the quantized version of X , Y with respect to the
partitions E∆1 , F∆2 respectively. Then, we have
I(X;Y ) = lim
∆1,∆2→0
I(X∆1 , Y∆2).
Note that a quantization of the eavesdropper observation Zn
might underestimate its knowledge from the legitimate users
point of view and implicitly increase the leakage. However,
by Lemma 1.2, for any δ > 0, if the quantized version Zn∆n
of Zn is fine enough, then the leakage is not compromised
and
|I(K;MZn)− I(K;MZn∆n)|< δ.
This argument is also used in [22], [41], [42].
We perform the quantization as follows. As in Lemma 1.2,
we jointly quantify X , Y , Z, U and V to form X∆X ,
Y∆Y , Z∆Z , U∆U , V∆V such that ∆X = ∆Y = ∆Z =
∆U = ∆V = l
−b and |X∆X |= |Y∆Y |= |Z∆Z |=
|U∆U |= |V∆V |= lb with b > 0. We now apply the
proof of the discrete case to the random variables X∆X ,
Y∆Y , Z∆Z , U∆U , V∆V . By Lemma 1.2, we can fix l
large enough such that |I(U∆U ;Y∆Y ) − I(U ;Y )|< δ/4,
|I(V∆V ;X∆X |U∆U ) − I(V ;X|U)|< δ/4, |I(U∆U ;Z∆Z ) −
I(U ;Z)|< δ/4, |I(V∆V ;Z∆Z |U∆U )− I(V ;Z|U)|< δ/4, and
Equation (27) becomes
k > bN [I(Y ;U)− I(V ;X|U)− I(U ;Z)− I(V ;Z|U)
− r5(, n,m)− δ]−
√
Nc.
At this point, we cannot conclude with the last inequality.
Indeed, in the term r5(, n,m) are hidden the following terms:
H(X∆X |ZY∆Y U∆U ) (see (18)), H(Y∆Y |Z∆ZU∆UV∆V )
(see (22)), H(U∆U ) and H(V∆V |U∆U ) (by definition of
r0()), which do not vanish to 0 as l get large. Now, if
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we choose  = n−a, where a ∈]0, 1/2[, so that for i ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3, 5}, δi(n) vanishes as n get large for l fixed,14 then
the asymptotic secret-key rate, for n large enough and as m
goes to infinity becomes as close as desired to
I(Y ;U)− I(V ;X|U)− I(U ;Z)− I(V ;Z|U).
Moreover, the leakage in (28), and the key error probability
between Alice an Bob in (29), still vanish to zero for n large
enough and as m goes to infinity.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2
As in [5], Theorem 4.2 is not directly deduced from
Theorem 4.1. We first consider the case of one-way public
communication, in which Alice sends messages to Bob, a first
time with rate R′1 and a second time with rate R
′
2. For this
scenario we note C∗rec the reconciliation capacity.
We can modify the proof of Proposition 5.1 to obtain for
R′1, R
′
2 ∈ R+,
C∗rec(R
′
1, R
′
2) > max
U,V
[I(U ;Y ) + I(V ;Y |U)]
subject to R′1 > I(X;U |Y ) (30)
R′2 > I(V ;X|Y U) (31)
U—X—Y, V—UX—Y.
Then, we can modify the proof of Theorem 4.1 to prove that
we can achieve the rate
R∗WSK(R
′
1, R
′
2) , max
U,V
(
[I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U)]+
+[I(Y ;V |U)− I(Z;V |U)]+) ,
subject to rate constraints (30), (31) and Markov conditions
U—X—Y Z, V—UX—Y Z, (32)
by a reconciliation phase followed by a privacy amplification
phase performed with extractors, and this time without the
assumption X → Y → Z. Note that Markov condition
U—V—X—Y Z, (33)
implies Markov conditions (32), and that if Markov condi-
tion (33) holds, then the rate constraint (31) becomes
R′2 > I(X;V |U)−I(Y ;V |U) > I(X;V )−I(Y ;V )−R′1.
Hence, for R′1, R
′
2 > 0 satisfying R
′
1 +R
′
2 = R1,
R∗WSK(R
′
1, R
′
2) > max
U,V
[I(Y ;V |U)− I(Z;V |U)],
subject to rate constraint R1 > I(X;V )−I(Y ;V ) and Markov
condition (33). We conclude by observing that CWSK(R1, 0) >
R∗WSK(R
′
1, R
′
2).
14Recall that Pe(, n) decreases exponentially to zero as n2 goes to
infinity.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1
A. Converse
Let R1, R2 ∈ R+. We first establish the rate constraints on
R1 and R2. We have
nR1 > H(A)
> I(A;Xn)− I(A;Y n)
(a)
= n[I(A;XJ |U˜)− I(A;YJ |U˜)]
(b)
= n[I(U ;XJ)− I(U ;YJ)], (34)
where (a) holds by [43, Lemma 4.1], if we set U˜ ,
XJ−1Y NJ+1J and J is a RV uniformly distributed on J1, nK,
independent of all previous RVs, (b) holds if we set U , AU˜ ,
since XJ and U˜ are independent.
Similarly, we have
nR2 > H(B|A)
(c)
> H(B|Xn) +H(Sˆ|S)− nδ()
(d)
> I(Sˆ;B|Xn) +H(Sˆ|BXn)− nδ()
= H(Sˆ|Xn)− nδ() (35)
= H(Sˆ|A)− I(Sˆ;Xn|A)− nδ()
(e)
= I(Sˆ;Y n|A)− I(Sˆ;Xn|A)− nδ()
(f)
= n[I(V ;YJ |U)− I(V ;XJ |U)]− nδ(),
where (c) holds because A is a function of Xn and by Fano’s
inequality, since for any  > 0, there exists a reconciliation
protocol such that P[S 6= Sˆ] 6 δ(),15 (d) holds since S =
ηa(X
n, B), (e) holds since Sˆ = ηb(Y n, A), (f) holds by [43,
Lemma 4.1] and if we set V , Sˆ.
We now determine the reconciliation capacity bound.
I(Sˆ;Xn) =
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆ;Xi|Xi−1)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(SˆXi−1;Xi)
6
n∑
i=1
I(SˆXi−1Y ni+1;Xi)
= n
n∑
i=1
P[J = i]I(SˆXJ−1Y nJ+1;XJ |J = i)
= nI(SˆU˜ ;XJ |J)
6 nI(V U ;XJ), (36)
where (a) holds because the Xi’s are i.i.d.. Then,
H(Sˆ)−H(AB)
= I(Sˆ;Xn) +H(Sˆ|Xn)−H(A)−H(B|A)
(b)
6 nI(V U ;XJ)−H(A) + nδ()
(c)
6 n[I(V ;XJ |U) + I(U ;YJ) + δ()],
15δ() denotes a function of  such that lim→0 δ() = 0.
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where (b) holds by (36) and since H(Sˆ|Xn) 6 H(B|A) +
nδ() by (35), and (c) holds by (34).
For a DMS, standard techniques [43] show that |U|6 |X |+2
and |V|6 |Y|.
B. Achievability
The proof for a DMS is similar to Wyner-Ziv coding [44],
we only describe the protocol. In the following, for n ∈ N
and  > 0, we note T n (X) the set of -letter-typical se-
quences [45] (also called “robustly typical sequence” in [21])
with respect to pX . We also define conditional typical sets as
follows, T n (Y |xn) , {yn : (xn, yn) ∈ T n (XY )}. We note
µX , minx∈supp(pX) pX(x). Let  > 0, and define 1 , 12,
2 , 2.
Code construction: Fix a joint probability distribution pUX
on U ×X and pUV Y on U ×V ×Y . Let Ru = I(X;U |Y ) +
6H(U), R′u = I(Y ;U)−3H(U). Generate 2n(Ru+R
′
u) code-
words, labeled un(ω, ν) with (ω, ν) ∈ J1, 2nRu K× J1, 2nR′uK,
by generating the symbols ui(ω, ν) for i ∈ J1, nK and
(ω, ν) ∈ J1, 2nRu K×J1, 2nR′uK independently according to pU .
Let Rv = I(V ;Y |XU) + 62H(V |U), R′v = I(V ;X|U) −
32H(V |U). For each (ω, ν), generate 2n(Rv+R′v) codewords,
labeled vn(ω, ν, k, l) with (k, l) ∈ J1, 2nRv K × J1, 2nR′vK,
by generating the symbols vi(ω, ν, k, l) for i ∈ J1, nK and
(k, l) ∈ J1, 2nRv K × J1, 2nR′vK independently according to
pV |U=ui(ω,ν).
Step1. At Alice’s side: Given xn, find a pair (ω, ν) s.t
(xn, un(ω, ν)) ∈ T n (XU). If we find several pairs, we choose
the smallest one (by lexicographic order). If we fail we choose
(ω, ν) = (1, 1). Define sn1 , un(ω, ν) and transmit a , ω.
Step2. At Bob’s side: Given yn and a, find ν˜ s.t
(yn, un(ω, ν˜)) ∈ T n (Y U) and define sˆn1 , un(ω, ν˜). If
there is one or more such ν˜, choose the lowest, otherwise set
ν˜ = 1. Find a pair (k, l) such that (sˆn1 , y
n, vn(ω, ν˜, k, l)) ∈
T n2 (UY V ). If there is one or more such (k, l), choose the
lowest, otherwise set (k, l) = (1, 1). Transmit b = k. Define
sˆn2 , vn(ω, ν˜, k, l) and sˆn , (sˆn1 , sˆn2 ).
Step3. At Alice’s side: Given sn1 = un(ω, ν) and b, find l˜
s.t (xn, sn1 , v
n(ω, ν˜, k, l˜)) ∈ T n2 (XUV ). If there is one or
more such l˜, choose the lowest, otherwise set l˜ = 1. Define
sn2 , vn(ω, ν˜, k, l˜) and sn , (sn1 , sn2 ).
We can show by standard arguments that there exists a
code, such that after one repetition of the protocol, Alice
obtains Sn = UnVˆ n, whereas Bob has Sˆn = UˆnV n
with P[Uˆn 6= Un] 6 δ(n),16 P[Vˆ n 6= V n] 6 δ(n),
P[Sˆn 6= Sn|Rn] 6 Pe(, n)17 and (Un, Xn), (Uˆn, Y n),
(Uˆn, Y n, V n), (Un, Vˆ n, Xn) jointly typical with probability
approaching one for n large.
To extend the result to a CMS, we proceed as in the proof of
Theorem 4.1.
16δ(n) denotes a function of  and n such that limn→∞ δ(n) = 0.
17We can show that Pe(, n) decreases exponentially to zero as n2 goes
to infinity.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.2
A. Proof of Part i)
The achievability and converse proof can be found in [1], it
remains to prove that equality holds in the rate constraint (3)
and that |U|6 |X |.
1) Equality constraint: We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. f(U) , I(Y ;U) and f1(U) , I(X;U |Y ) are
convex in pU |X .
Proof. Let λ ∈ [0, 1], let U1, U2 defined by pU1|X and pU2|X
respectively, be s.t. U1—X—Y and U2—X—Y .
We introduce the random variable Q ∈ {1, 2} independent of
all others and set U = UQ.
Q ,
{
1 with probability λ,
2 with probability 1− λ.
I(Y ;U) 6 I(Y ;UQ)
= I(Y ;Q) + I(Y ;U |Q)
(a)
= I(Y ;U |Q)
= λI(Y ;U1) + (1− λ)I(Y ;U2),
where (a) holds since Y and Q are independent.
I(X;U |Y ) 6 I(X;UQ|Y )
= I(X;Q|Y ) + I(X;U |Y Q)
(b)
= I(X;U |Y Q)
= λ(I(X;U1|Y ) + (1− λ)(I(X;U2|Y ),
where (b) holds because H(X|Y Q) = H(X|Y ), since Q and
(X,Y ) are independent. 
By Lemma 4.1, f(U) and f1(U) are convex in pU |X . Define
∆ , {u ∈ R|U||X | : ∀i, j ∈ J1, |U|K × J1, |X |K,∑|U|k=1 ukj =
1, uij > 0}, and C , {u ∈ ∆ : f1(u) 6 R1}.
We first show that C is convex compact, with extreme points
in {u ∈ ∆ : f1(u) = R1}:
• C is the preimage of [0, R1] by the continuous function
f1, thus C is closed. We deduce that C is compact, since
C ⊂ [0, 1]|U||X | and [0, 1]|U||X | is compact.
• C is convex by convexity of f1, since the sublevels of a
convex function are convex sets.
• Let u1 ∈ C s.t. f1(u1) = R1 − δ, with δ > 0. By
continuity of f1, ∃0,∀u ∈ B(u1, 0), |f1(u)− f1(u1)|<
δ. Let u0 ∈ B(u1, 0)\{u1}, λ ∈
{− 12 ,+ 12} and
uλ = λu0 + (1− λ)u1.
Then ||uλ − u1||= ||λ(u0 − u1)||6 |λ|0, which means
uλ ∈ C. Hence, 12 uλ=+1/2 + 12 uλ=−1/2 = u1, and we
conclude that u1 is not an extreme point. Hence, the set of
extreme points of C is a subset of {u ∈ ∆ : f1(u) = R1}.
Since f is continuous, it reaches a maximum umax on the
compact C. Then, since f is convex and C is a convex compact,
by the Krein-Milman Theorem,18 umax is a convex linear
18 A compact convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space
is the closed convex hull of the set of its extreme points. Actually, only a
weaker version is used since a finite dimensional space is considered.
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combination of extreme points of C (existence of such extreme
points comes directly from the Krein-Milman theorem, since
C 6= ∅ ). Hence, umax =
∑n
k=1 λkuk, with
∑n
k=1 λk = 1 ,
λ1, λ2, . . . , λn > 0 and u1,u2, . . . ,un extreme points of C.
By convexity of f ,
f(umax) 6
n∑
k=1
λkf(uk) 6
n∑
k=1
λkf(umax) = f(umax),
thus
n∑
k=1
λk(f(umax)− f(uk)) = 0,
which means that there exists i ∈ J1, nK s.t f(umax) = f(ui).
We conclude that umax is an extreme point of C. This result
is known as the maximum principle [46].
2) Cardinality bound |U|6 |X |: This result is a special case
of a more general one that we prove in Appendix D-B2.
B. Proof of Part ii)
The proof is partially found in [20] and all that remains to
be proved are the equality in the communication rate constraint
and the range constraint |U|6 |X |.
1) Equality in the constraint: To prove that equality holds
in the constraint for the argument of the maximum in Propo-
sition 5.2.b, we can reuse the proof of Proposition 5.2.a
in Appendix D-A1, so that we only need to show that
f(U) = I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) is convex in pU |X . To obtain the
convexity of f , we replace (X,Y ) by (Y,Z) in the function
f1 of Lemma 4.1.
2) Range constraint |U|6 |X |: The proof relies on a
technique used in [47].
Define
R , {(R,R1) : R > I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U),
R1 > I(X;U)− I(Y ;U), with U—X—Y—Z} ,
C , {(R,R1) : R > I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U),
R1 = I(X;U)− I(Y ;U), with U—X—Y—Z} .
Note that the capacity region C is from Proposition 5.2.b and
that the equality in the communication rate constraint is crucial
to make it a subset of R. By [47, Lemma 3],
R = {(R,R1) : ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ R+, λ1R+ λ2R1 > G(λ1, λ2)} ,
where ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ R+,
G(λ1, λ2) , inf
U s.t
U—X—Y—Z
[λ1(I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U))
+λ2(I(X;U)− I(Y ;U))] .
Consequently G(λ1, λ2) is sufficient information to describe
R. Then, we show that for all λ1, λ2 ∈ R+, G(λ1, λ2) can
be achieved by considering a discrete random variable U such
that |U|6 |X |.
Let λ1, λ2 ∈ R+, let P in [47, Lemma 2] be the |X |-
dimensional probability simplex, and let X = {xi}|X |i=1. Con-
sider P as a set of elements of the form
(P[X = x1|U = u],P[X = x2|U = u], . . . ,
P[X = x|X ||U = u]
)
,
with u ∈ U . Then, each probability distribution on U defines a
measure µ on P . Define HP (X), HP (Y ), and HP (Z) as the
entropies of X , Y , and Z respectively, when the distribution
of X is P ∈ P . Define
f1(P ) , λ1(HP (Z)−HP (Y )) + λ2(HP (Y )−HP (X))
fj(P ) , P (xj), for j ∈ J2, |X |K.
Let P ∗X achieve G(λ1, λ2), and let µ
∗ be such that∫
P Pµ
∗(dP ) = P ∗X . Denote by H
∗(X) the entropy of X
under probability distribution P ∗X . Then, by [47, Lemma 2],
there exists P1, P2, . . . , P|X |, and α1, α2, . . . , α|X | such that,∑|X |
i=1 αi = 1,
∀j ∈ J2, |X |K, P ∗X(xj) = ∫
P
fj(P )µ
∗(dP ) =
|X |∑
i=1
αifj(Pi),
and,
λ1(H
∗(Z|U)−H∗(Y |U)) + λ2(H∗(Y |U)−H∗(X|U))
=
∫
P
f1(P )µ
∗(dP ) =
|X |∑
i=1
αif1(Pi).
From P ∗X(xj), j ∈ J2, |X |K, we can compute H∗(X), H∗(Y ),
and H∗(Z), then
λ1(H
∗(Y )−H∗(Y |U)−H∗(Z) +H∗(Z|U))
+ λ2(H
∗(X)−H∗(X|U)−H∗(Y ) +H∗(Y |U))
= λ1(I
∗(Y ;U)− I∗(Z;U)) + λ2(I∗(X;U)− I∗(Y ;U))
= G(λ1, λ2).
We have thus shown that we can choose U such that |U|6 |X |
to achieve G(λ1, λ2). Consequently, it is enough to consider
U such that |U|6 |X |, to form the set R, as well as the set
C, since C ⊂ R.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.3
If R1 > H(X|Y ), then by Proposition 5.2.b CWSK(R1, 0) =
I(X;Y ). Assume R1 ∈]0;H(X|Y )[ in the following. We note
X = {0, 1} and by Proposition 5.2.b, we can assume U =
{u1, u2}. We note β1 = p(X = 1|U = u1) and β2 = p(X =
0|U = u2). We can write
I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y )− (H(X)−H(Y ))
= −
∑
i=1,2
p(ui)[H(X|U = ui)−H(Y |U = ui)]
= −
∑
i=1,2
p(ui)[Hb(βi)−H(Y |U = ui)]
= −
∑
i=1,2
p(ui)
[
Hb(βi) +
∑
y∈Yp(y|ui) log p(y|ui)
]
, (37)
with ∀y ∈ Y ,
p(y|u1) = (1− β1)p(y|X = 0) + β1p(y|X = 1), (38)
p(y|u2) = β2p(y|X = 0) + (1− β2)p(y|X = 1). (39)
Moreover, since the channel pY |X is symmetric, there exists
a permutation pi ∈ S|Y| such that
∀y ∈ Y,∀x ∈ X , p(y|x) = p(pi(y)|x⊕ 1), (40)
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where ⊕ denotes the modulo 2 operation. Thus by (37), (38),
(39), (40) there exists gY |X19 such that H(Y |U = u1) =
gY |X(β1), H(Y |U = u2) = gY |X(β2). Then,
I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y )− (H(X)−H(Y ))
= −
∑
i=1,2
p(ui)
[
Hb(βi)− gY |X(βi)
]
. (41)
Similarly, by using that the channel pZ|X is symmetric, there
exists gZ|X such that H(Z|U = u1) = gZ|X(β1) and
H(Z|U = u2) = gZ|X(β2). Thus, we also have
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)− (H(Y )−H(Z))
= −
∑
i=1,2
p(ui)
[
gY |X(βi)− gZ|X(βi)
]
. (42)
Consider the region R1,
⋃
β0∈[0,1]
Rβ0 and R2 ,
⋃
(β1,β2)∈[0,1]2
Rβ1,β2 ,
with
Rβ0,{(R,R1) :R 6 H(Y )−H(Z)−gY |X(β0)+gZ|X(β0),
R16H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(β0)+gY |X(β0)
}
,
Rβ1,β2 , {(R,R1) : R 6 I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U),
R1 6 I(X;U)− I(Y ;U)} .
We can verify that both regions R1 and R2 are convex and
that R1 ⊂ R2. We will use a similar technique as in [48],
based on Lemma 5.1, to show that R1 = R2.20 Then, thanks
to the refinement proposed in Proposition 5.2.b (equality in
the constraint), we will be able to conclude for any R1 ∈ R+,
CWSK(R1,0)= max
β0∈[0,1]
(
H(Y )−H(Z)−gY |X(β0)+gZ|X(β0)
)
such that R1 = H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(β0)+gY |X(β0).
Lemma 5.1 ( [48] [46]). Let C ⊂ Rd be convex. Let C1 ⊂ C2
be two bounded convex subsets of C, closed relative to C. If
every supporting hyperplanes of C2 intersects with C1, then
C1 = C2.
Let (R,R1) ∈ R2, and let α ∈ [0, 1], then we have
by (41), (42)
αR+ (1− α)R1
6 α(I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U)) + (1− α)(I(X;U)− I(Y ;U))
=
∑
i=1,2
p(ui)[α(H(Y )−H(Z)− gY |X(βi) + gZ|X(βi))
+ (1− α)(H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(βi) + gY |X(βi))]
6 α(H(Y )−H(Z)− gY |X(β∗) + gZ|X(β∗)) + (1− α)
× (H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(β∗) + gY |X(β∗)), (43)
where
β∗ , argmax
β
(α(H(Y )−H(Z)− gY |X(β) + gZ|X(β))
+ (1− α)(1−H(Y )−Hb(β) + gY |X(β))).
19The exact description of gY |X is not important here, what matters is that
H(Y |U = u1) and H(Y |U = u2) can be expressed with the same function.
20Note that the fact that R1 and R are both lower bounds in R1 and R2 is
crucial to show R1 = R2. The same argument cannot apply if R is a lower
bound and R1 an upper bound, whence the importance of the equality in the
constraint shown in Proposition 5.2.b.
With the last inequality, we show that every supporting plane
of R2 intersects R1. Note that the weight coefficients of
(R,R1) have been taken of the form (α, 1 − α) with α ∈
[0, 1], because by positivity and convexity of R2, we only
needed to consider hyperplanes (lines) with negative slope to
apply Lemma 5.1.
Let (R0, R01) be a boundary point of R2. There exists a
supporting hyperplane H0 at (R0, R01) defined by (α0, 1−α0).
By Equation (43), there exists β∗0 ∈ [0, 1] such that
α0R0 + (1− α0)R01 6 α0R∗ + (1− α0)R∗1,
where (R∗, R∗1) , (H(Y ) − H(Z) − gY |X(β∗0) +
gZ|X(β∗0), H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(β∗0)+gY |X(β∗0)). Then, since
(R∗, R∗1) ∈ R1 ⊂ R2, we also have, by definition of H0
α0R∗ + (1− α0)R∗1 6 α0R0 + (1− α0)R01.
Hence, α0R∗ + (1− α0)R∗1 = α0R0 + (1− α0)R01, and thus
(R∗, R∗1) ∈ H0.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.6
Consider X ∼ N (0, σ2x), N ∼ N (0, σ2n), Y = X +N . We
have σ2y = σ
2
x + σ
2
n and
pX(x) =
1√
2piσ2x
exp
[
− x
2
2σ2x
]
,
pX|Y (x|y) = 1√
2pi
σy
σxσn
exp
[
− 1
2σ2n
σ2y
σ2x
(
x− σ
2
x
σ2y
y
)2]
.
Let l ∈ N∗ and k ∈ J1, lK. Define tk , a(2k−1l−1 − 1) and
∆ , 2al−1 . Let U be a scalar quantized version of X , defined
as follows.
pU (uk) ,
∫ tk+1
tk
pX(x)dx = pX(x¯k)∆,
∀y ∈ Y, pU |Y (uk|y) , pX|Y (x¯k|y)∆,
where x¯k ∈ [tk, tk+1] by the mean value theorem for integra-
tion. Hence,
H(U) = SU−log ∆, with SU , −∆
∑
k
pX(x¯k) log pX(x¯k).
Observe that SU is a Riemann sum that approaches h(X) =
− ∫ pX log pX . Thus, if we set f(x) , −pX(x) log pX(x),
we can show that for any a ∈ R+,21
|h(X)− SU | =
∣∣∣∣∫ f − SU ∣∣∣∣
6
∣∣∣∣∫ −a−∞ f +
∫ +∞
a
f
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣SU − ∫ a−a f
∣∣∣∣
6 1(a) +K1(a)∆,
with K1(a) , amax[−a,a]|f ′|, 1(a) , e−
a2
2σ2x [α1a+β1], and
α1, β1 constants.
21We used a standard Riemann sum error bound, and erfc(x) 6 e−x2 .
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Similarly, if we define
SU |Y , −∆
∑
k
∫
y
pXY (x¯k, y) log pX|Y (x¯k|y)dy,
and g(x) ,
∫
pXY (x, y) log pX|Y (x|y)dy, then, as previously,
we can show that for any a ∈ R+,
|h(X|Y )− SU |Y |6 2(a) +K2(a)∆,
with K2(a) , amax[−a,a]|g′|, 2(a) , e−
a2
2σ2x [α2a+ β2], and
α2, β2 constants. Thus,
log ∆− (2(a) +K2(a)∆)
6 h(X|Y )−H(U |Y )
6 log ∆ + 2(a) +K2(a)∆.
Hence, for any a ∈ R+, if we take ∆ small enough, then
|log ∆| 2(a) + K2(a)∆, such that h(X|Y ) − H(U |Y ) ≈
log ∆, and
|I(X;Y )− I(Y ;U)|
= |h(X)− SU + SU |Y − h(X|Y )|
6 (a) +K(a)∆
6 (a) +K(a) exp[h(X|Y )−H(U |Y )]
= (a) +K(a) exp[h(X|Y )−R1],
where (a) , 1(a) + 2(a), K(a) , K1(a) +K2(a).
To sum up, ∆ chosen small enough ensures that I(Y ;U)
approaches I(X;Y ) exponentially fast as R1 > h(X|Y )
increases.
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